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FLORIDA ADOPTION INTERVENTION
STATUTE: BALANCING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PARENTS
WITH THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
DEPENDENT CHILD
Taylor Smith*
The Honorable Patricia Strowbridge**
In 2003, the Florida Legislature took a dynamic, and rather
controversial step, when it created a statutory process requiring a dramatic
increase in the level of cooperation between the dependency system and
private adoption entities. 1 When parents choose to participate in a private
adoption of their child, who is in the custody of the Florida Department of
Children and Families (DCF), rather than participate in reunification
through the dependency process, the statutory process not only permits
them to do so, but also empowers them to be an active participant.2 Section
63.082(6) of the Florida Statutes quickly became known as the “Adoption
Intervention Statute.” The statute required the dependency court to permit
a private adoption entity to “intervene” in the dependency case as a “party
in interest” when a parent had executed a valid adoption consent in favor
of the adoption entity and had selected a prospective adoptive family with
an approved home study. 3
Although initially it was not necessarily embraced by either DCF or
the dependency courts, the appellate courts interpreted the statute early on
to require the dependency system to respect the rights of the parents and

*J.D., 2017, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law.
** Osceola County Associate Administrative Judge; J.D., Georgetown University.
1H.B. 835, 105th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012).
2FLA. STAT. § 63.022(5) (2014).
3Fla. Stat. § 63.082(6)(a)–(b); The Florida Senate, Review Of Section 63.082(6), F.S.,
Intervention By Private Adoption Entities In The Adoption of Certain Children In The
Custody Of The Department Of Children And Families, Interim Report 2010–104,
October 2009, http://centerforchildwelfare.fmhi.usf.edu/kb/FlPerformance/
LegisCommittee-Adoption2009.pdf.
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the private adoption entities selected by the parents. 4 The early cases dealt
primarily with statutory interpretation and analysis of legislative intent;
they did not delve deeply into the constitutional dimensions that undergird
the statutory scheme. An amendment to the statute in 2012 brought sharply
into focus that this is not simply an issue of an adoption entity having a
“sufficient interest in the outcome of the litigation” to permit their
involvement, but rather it identified a balancing of the fundamental rights
of the parent(s) against a compelling state interest in the protection of “at
risk” children. 5 The 2012 amendment substantially altered the Intervention
Statute by identifying the process as a “right” of the parent; the
dependency court and DCF were required to advise the parent(s) of this
“right” prior to filing a petition seeking a termination of parental rights. 6
Thus, the discussion is less about the cost savings to the State of Florida
realized by moving children more quickly into permanency through the
resources of private adoption entities, and more about utilizing a “least
restrictive means” approach to protecting children in Florida. 7
There are numerous benefits that can inure to children when they
receive a forever family that is stable and committed to their welfare, but
this can be difficult to achieve when the child’s biological parents are not
willing to cooperate. The challenge, from a policy perspective, has been
to create opportunities for reunification when appropriate, while
simultaneously removing the legal and practical barriers to permanency
for those families for whom reunification is not the best option. A critical
component of the permanency objective is to create a process unhindered
by the inherent hostility that parents have toward the “system” and toward
those authority figures who removed the child from the parents in the first
place. The private sector offers parents the opportunity to proactively
participate in the permanency decision with a measure of control that the
dependency system cannot provide. The parents do not view the private
adoption entities in the same negative manner, but rather as advocates for
the parents’ rights in the permanency planning for the child.
In most circumstances, the identification and establishment of
fundamental constitutional rights of the parents, and the societal
commitment to the best interest of the child, run on parallel tracks with a
common objective that benefits the family. In the case of dependent
children, however, these concepts are on an inevitable collision course.

4Adoption

Miracles, LLC v. S.C.W. (In the Interest of S.N.W.), 912 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
5See Fla. Stat. § 63.082(6)(b) (2014); H.B. 1163, 114th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012).
6Id. at § 63.082(6)(g).
7See generally id. at § 63.082(6) (2014).
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Balancing these interests when they come into conflict requires a deep
understanding of both human dynamics and legal principles.
CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The United States Supreme Court first recognized a fundamental
right of a parent to the “care, custody and management” of their child in
the case of Meyer v. Nebraska. 8 The recognition of fundamental rights
under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution had been
limited to:
[F]reedom from bodily restraint . . . the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 9
The Meyer case deals with an attempt by the State of Nebraska to
prohibit foreign language education to grade school children and outlined
a concept of “liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, which was significantly more expansive than previous
interpretations. 10 Prior to the Meyer case, and, to some extent still
promulgated in the Meyer case, children were culturally identified as being
the “property” of the parents. 11 Coming before the high court at a point in
history when the recognition of individual rights and individual
determination was enjoying unprecedented popularity, the case was a
timely step in the direction of recognizing the family unit as a protected
zone which should remain free from unnecessary intrusion by the state. 12
The Meyer case was not about the “rights” of children, or even uniquely
about the “best interest of the children,” but was essentially about the
rights of parents to control their children. 13
Two years later, in the case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy
Name of Jesus and Mary, the United States Supreme Court declared an
Oregon statute unconstitutional, which required children to attend public

8See

Meyer v. Neb., 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923).
at 399.
10Id. at 397.
11Id. at 401
12Id. at 401-03.
13Id. at 401.
9Id.

60

CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:55

school and forbid their attendance at private schools. 14 Taking the
concepts of the Meyer case a step further, the United States Supreme Court
clarified that this fundamental right of parents not only extended to what
they chose to teach their children, but it also extended to the manner in
which their children would be educated. 15 In Meyer, the United States
Supreme Court prevented the prosecution of parents or teachers who were
educating children within the public school system. 16 In this environment,
the State could still maintain significant control over the content of the
education, but the Pierce case clarified that these parental rights now
prevented the State from holding children’s education captive within the
State controlled school system. 17 Private education gave parents far greater
control over the content of their children’s education. 18 These two cases
together cleared the way for our modern recognition of a substantive due
process right to “the care, custody and management” of children. 19
Seventy-five years later, the United States Supreme Court issued its
landmark decision in the case of Troxel v. Granville.20 In Troxel, the high
court was asked to consider whether a Washington statute permitting “any
person” to petition for visitation rights with a child “at any time” upon an
argument to the state superior courts that visitation would be in the “best
interests of the child” was constitutionally permissible.21
In the tragic fact pattern, paternal grandparents, Jennifer and Gary
Troxel, petitioned for visitation with their two young granddaughters after
their son committed suicide and the children’s mother decided to limit
their contact. 22 Although initially successful under the Washington statute,
the Troxels’ visitation with their granddaughters was suspended on appeal,
and the Washington Supreme Court concluded that the Washington statute
violated the United States Constitution. 23 The Washington Supreme Court
stated, “[i]t is not within the province of the state to make significant
decisions concerning the custody of children merely because it could make
a ‘better’ decision.” 24
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Washington Supreme Court but issued a lengthy decision that included
14Pierce

v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530.
at 534–35.
16See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97, 402.
17Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
18Id. at 534.
19See id.; see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390.
20See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
21Id. at 60.
22Id. at 60–61.
23Id. at 62–63.
24See id. at 63.
15Id.
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two concurring opinions and three separate dissenting opinions. 25
Although the diversity of opinions reflects the complexity of the issues
presented, all of the justices acknowledged and supported the historical
development of the recognition of substantive due process rights of
parents. 26 The plurality decision of the United States Supreme Court made
it clear that the decisions of the mother were consistent with her
fundamental substantive due process rights. 27 Therefore, the State can only
infringe upon these rights when a compelling state interest is invoked, and
even then, the infringement will be subject to strict scrutiny by the Court
and a requirement that the infringement be the least restrictive means to
accomplish that compelling interest.28 Since the Washington statute could
not withstand this analysis, it was determined to be constitutionally
infirm. 29
The Troxel case dealt with an indisputably “fit” parent, in which no
allegation of abuse, abandonment or neglect had been made, but the
constitutional framework establishes the appropriate analysis for the
consideration of the boundaries of parental rights in the context of
dependency proceedings. 30 In a least restrictive means analysis, one must
be careful to remember that the dependency system legitimately exists
solely for the purpose of protecting the child from abuse, abandonment or
neglect. 31 It is not appropriate for the state to countermand the decisions
of the parent that resolve the risk to the child in an appropriate manner
simply because the Court, the child welfare case manager, or the child’s
Guardian ad Litem, believe that a different permanency plan would be a
better option for the child. 32 That approach violates the least restrictive
means test. 33
25See

id. at 57.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57.
27Id. at 65.
28Id at 72–73.
29Id at 73.
30Id. at 68.
31See Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs, 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
32See id.
33See Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 565 (the termination of parental rights must be the least
restrictive means of protecting the children from harm); see also In re K.C.C, 750 So. 2d
38 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1999); see also In the Interest of D.A.H., 390 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 5th
D.C.A. 1980) (holding “When the State undertakes to permanently deprive a natural
parent of the right to rear her children, the courts should zealously protect the rights of
the parent and insure that this drastic action strictly conforms to the legislative
guidelines.”) See also N.S. v. Department of Children & Families, 36 So. 3d 776, 778
(Fla.3d D.C.A. 2010) (holding, “. . . DCF must proceed in a narrowly tailored manner
and must prove that, in addition to the statutory requirements for termination of parental
rights, that termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious
harm.”)
26See
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In 2004, a pair of decisions from the Florida Supreme Court, Florida
Department of Children and Families v. F.L. and B.C. v. Florida
Department of Children and Families, reiterated the proper constitutional
analysis to be applied when contemplating a potential termination of
parental rights in a juvenile dependency proceeding. 34 Dependency cases
present a special challenge to this constitutional analysis because of the
natural tendency to question whether these principles should apply in the
same manner to parents who have been accused of, or have been found to
be guilty of, abuse, abandonment or neglect of their children. Both of the
above mentioned Florida Supreme Court cases acknowledged the
existence of the parents’ “fundamental liberty interest,” and focused on the
state’s obligation to employ the “least restrictive means” to accomplish its
goal of protecting the child from harm. 35 The Florida Supreme Court in
B.C. lays out the precedent for how to analyze termination of parental
rights on grounds that the parent will be incarcerated for a period of time
that would constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the
child turns eighteen. 36 The Court acknowledged that because parents have
a fundamental liberty interest in determining the care and upbringing of
their children, the termination of parental rights must be the least
restrictive means to protect the child from serious harm. 37 For the
termination to be the least restrictive, the Court may take into account prior
incarceration time, but requiring the court to consider past incarceration
would be inconsistent with the constitutional rights of the parent. 38 Thus,
the appropriate consideration is not whether the parent’s total incarceration
period would constitute a substantial period of time before the child’s
eighteenth birthday, but whether from the time the Termination of Parental
Rights Petition is filed to the child’s eighteenth birthday constitutes such
a substantial period of time. 39 In F.L., the Florida Supreme Court rejected
the argument that when the State petitions to terminate parental rights on
grounds that the parent has had their parental rights terminated to another
child in the past that there is a rebuttable presumption in which the parent
must show that past conduct cannot predict the current child is at a
substantial risk of harm. 40 The Court stated that petitioning to terminate
parental rights based on a parent’s past termination of parental rights is
constitutional, however, it would be unconstitutional to shift the State’s
34See Fla. Dep’t of Children and Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 603 (Fla. 2004); see
also B.C v. Fla. Department of Children & Families, 887 So. 2d 1046, 1050 (Fla. 2004).
35 Id.
36B.C., 887 So. 2d at 1052.
37Id. at 1050.
38Id. at 1052.
39 Id.
40F.L., 880 So. 2d at 609.
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burden of proving the risk of harm to the child onto the parent to disprove
any potential harm to the child. 41 These cases are consistent with the
premise that a parent’s right to the upbringing of their child is always a
fundamental right and that right must be fairly balanced with the State’s
interest in the welfare of children.
The Troxel court acknowledged a “presumption that fit parents act in
the best interests of their children,” but what about “unfit” parents, or
“questionably fit” parents? 42 The analysis may be more complex in these
cases, but in the earlier United States Supreme Court decision of Santosky
v. Kramer, the Court made clear that a parent’s fundamental liberty interest
in determining the care and upbringing of a child “does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents.” 43 Also, because of the
implication of these constitutional rights, an adjudication of dependency
will not necessarily support a termination of parental rights if this is not
the least restrictive means to protect the child from harm. 44
HISTORY OF THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD STANDARD
In 1875, the first organization dedicated to the protection of children
was established in New York. 45 This non-governmental agency, the New
York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, was dedicated to
raising awareness of child abuse and advocating privately for the
protection of endangered children. 46 Private organizations worked
tirelessly to assist children. 47 Unfortunately they were limited in authority
to truly assist any but the most obvious and egregious cases. 48 By the
middle part of the twentieth century, however, child welfare was primarily
handled by government agencies. 49 A series of federal laws both funded
the governmental agencies, and clarified their role in protecting children
from harm. 50 These developments rapidly increased the authority and

41

Id.

42Troxel,

530 U.S. at 68.
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
44See L.M.C. v. DCF Servs. (In the Interest of O.C.), 934 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. St. App.
2006); See also B.C. v. Fla. DCF, 887 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2004); See also Fla. DCF v. F.L.,
880 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2004).
45John E.B. Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in America, 42 Fam. L.Q. 449,
449 (2008).
46Id. at 452.
47Id. at 452.
48Id. at 452.
49Id. at 452.
50Id. at 453.
43Santosky
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effectiveness of the intervention on behalf of abused, abandoned, and
neglected children. 51
Simultaneous with the development of child welfare laws and
increased governmental involvement in child protection, came the
transition from orphanages to foster care as the primary system for caring
for the children. 52 Implementation of these laws, which eventually
included mandatory child abuse reporting, resulted in dramatic increases
in the scope and responsibility of state child welfare systems but also
caused a dramatic increase in the number of families impacted by the
mandates. 53 The resulting crisis of an overwhelmed system has generated
an active dialogue that continues to the present day, over ways to properly
address the best interests of the child without either endangering the child
through improper reunification, or irreparably damaging the family by the
unnecessary intrusion into their lives. Rising numbers of children,
disproportionately African-American children; physically or mentally
handicapped children; and older children have languished for years in the
state foster care systems, requiring political and moral incentives to create
and increase permanency options for the children.54
The passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980, directed state child welfare systems to step up efforts to reunite
families and develop programs designed to avoid removal of children from
the care of their parents. 55 Arguably, the law was nominally effective in
reducing the number of children in out-of-home care, but the resulting
tragedies from vulnerable children being placed back into the care of
abusive parents created a whole new set of problems for state child welfare
agencies to deal with. Conversely, attempts to move children quickly to
permanency within the child welfare system through termination of
parental rights has placed the agencies on a collision course with the courts
and with the constitutional rights of the parents. The system has struggled
internally to find solutions, and some have begun to question if the
“solution” does not need to come from somewhere else.
FLORIDA STATUTE § 63.082(6)
Jeanne T. Tate, a board certified adoption attorney with an extensive
background in the area of adoption law, has been an active advocate for

51

Id.

supra note 48, at 456.
Id.
54Id. at 458.
55See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, §94, Stat.
500 (1980).
52Myers,
53
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improvement in Florida’s intervention statute. 56 In an interview with Ms.
Tate, she stated that prior to 2003, efforts to effectuate a cooperative
relationship between private adoption entities and the Florida Department
of Children and Families (“DCF”) had been largely unsuccessful. 57
Although there were frequent discussions about attempting to find ways
to bring the private entities’ waiting families together with the lengthy list
of Florida’s waiting children, there were fundamental flaws in the
approach, which virtually ensured that no progress would be made. 58
Private adoption agencies and attorneys, with qualified families anxious
for a solution to the sometimes-lengthy wait for a child to adopt, were
56Jeanne T. Tate is the current managing partner of the Law Office of Jeanne T. Tate, PA.
She has reached the heights of professional excellence and has been AV rated by
Martindale Hubbell. Ms. Tate has extensive experience in adoption law; she is a board
certified adoption attorney where, throughout her career, she has placed over 2,000
children into loving homes. Ms. Tate is a member of the American Academy of Adoption
Attorneys and The Florida Adoption Council and has been active in interstate compact
adoptions. She works closely with adoption agencies to provide a full range of services to
birth parents and adoptive families and owns her own adoption agency, Heart of
Adoptions, Inc. She also founded Heart of Adoptions Alliance, Inc., a non-profit
501(c)(3) COA accredited agency. Jeanne has appeared on national and local television
on the subject of adoption and lobbies extensively in this area.
Ms. Tate has been recognized as an Angel in Adoption by the Congressional Coalition on
Adoption and has consistently been named as one of The Best Lawyers in America,
Florida’s Legal Elite and Florida Super Lawyers. She has been a member of the Florida
Bar Adoption Law Certification Committee (2010-2015) and Hillsborough County’s
Local Planning Committee for Florida’s Five Year Plan for the Promotion of Adoption
and Support of Adoptive Families (2009), and various other organizations, She currently
maintains membership in the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys, Florida
Adoption Council, and the Florida Association of Adoption Professionals, as well as
many others.
Jeanne graduated with high honors in 1978 from the University of Florida with a B.S.s
degree in Journalism, and, in 1981, she graduated with honors from the University Of
Florida College Of Law. Ms. Tate has received an outstanding number of prestigious
honors and awards including The Tobias Simon Pro Bono Award bestowed by the
Florida Supreme Court, Best Lawyers’ 2013 Tampa Family Law Lawyer of the Year,
2012 HCBA Jimmy Kynes Pro Bono Service award, Super Lawyers Top 50 Women
Attorneys in Florida 2012, 2013, and 2015, 2010 ABA Solo and Small Firm Lifetime
Achievement Award; 2010 U.S. News – Top Tier Best Lawyers “Best Law Firms”; 2010
Tampa Bay Parenting Magazine Extraordinary Woman; Guardian Angel, Voiced for
Children (2009); Tampa Bay Business Journal Business Woman of the Year (2009);
HAWL Achievement Award (2009), Small Business Leader of the Year by the Tampa
Chamber of Commerce (2006), Hillsborough County’s Pro Bono Firm Award (2006) and
the Florida Adoption Council’s Lifetime Achievement Award (2004). Ms. Tate’s
professional affiliations include the following: United States Supreme Court, Florida Bar;
Hillsborough County Bar Association; Florida Association of Women Lawyers, Bay
Area Volunteer Lawyers Program; Athena Society and the Hillsborough County
Association for Women Lawyers.
57Telephone Interview with Jeanne T. Tate, Managing Partner, Jeanne T. Tate, P.A. (June
28, 2016).
58 Id.
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initially open to the idea of a cooperative arrangement. 59 The agencies and
attorneys quickly realized, however, that the state child welfare agency’s
concept was that qualified families would simply be referred to DCF to
adopt those children for whom DCF was unable to locate a suitable
adoptive family. 60 Typically, these were older children with behavioral
challenges or larger sibling groups, and the private adoption agencies and
attorneys had few families possessing the requisite skill set and/or
commitment to handle these children. 61 Essentially, the families who were
interested in adopting these types of children likely had contacted DCF to
begin with, as they would have been the best source for these referrals.62
When the private entities requested to discuss providing families for
younger children and children without identifiable behavioral challenges,
they were advised that DCF “didn’t need” families for these children. 63
This approach effectively ended the initial discussions regarding
cooperation between the state and the private sector until a new paradigm
could be created. 64
That new approach came with the passage of Florida Statute §
63.082(6) in 2003. Instead of continuing the attempts to convince the
private sector to meet the needs of the public child welfare agency, the
new statute was predicated on the controversial idea that DCF would be
required to cooperate with the private adoption agencies and attorneys
whenever the parents of a dependent child chose to have their child
removed from the child welfare system and placed into a private adoptive
home. 65 Although far removed from the original concept of cooperation
suggested by DCF, for a number of reasons, the new approach quickly
caught on and became popular with both the birth parents and the
prospective adoptive parents. Eventually, DCF and the juvenile courts
began to pass from acceptance to embracing the process created in the
statute.
Behind the design of the new “cooperation” was a set of assumptions
and principles that, once considered, rendered the revolutionary approach
far more logical than it might at first have appeared, to wit . . .
A. Parents often view DCF as “the enemy”;

Id.
Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64Jeanne T. Tate, supra note 56.
65Fla. Stat. § 63.082(6) (2003).
59
60
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B. Parents typically view the private adoption agency or
attorney, they chose to work with, as truly advocating
for their child’s best interest;
C. Adoptive parents tend to view DCF as unresponsive
and steeped in bureaucracy;
D. Adoptive parents typically view the private adoption
agency or attorney, they chose to work with, as
advocating for their best interests;
E. Delays inherent in the dependency system often result
in children spending an unreasonable length of time
without permanency;
F. Private adoption is able to create permanency quickly;
G. Some parents genuinely believe that adoption is the
best outcome for their child, but they would never
voluntarily surrender their child to DCF (see
subparagraph A above);
H. The fact that a parent has failed to meet acceptable
standards of care for their child does not automatically
equate to that parent being incapable of making an
appropriate permanency plan for their child in an
adoptive home;
I. Having the opportunity to select an adoptive family,
and negotiate for ongoing pictures and letters about
their child’s progress, empowers a parent to actively
participate in a permanency plan for their child;
J. Private adoption agencies and attorneys are fully
qualified to evaluate prospective families, educate and
train families to meet the needs of the children they
might adopt, and provide both legal processing and
post placement support, all at little or no cost to the
taxpayers. 66
This is not to say that individual cases will not have challenges, and
not every intervention case will go forward without questions or concerns
relative to the best interest of the child, but the 2003 statute marked a
turning point in the manner in which the State of Florida balances the
rights of the parents with the needs of the child. 67 It was a remarkable case
of “thinking outside the box” and has enabled many children to move
beyond involvement in the dependency system into a forever family.
66Jeanne
67Jeanne

T. Tate, supra note 56.
T. Tate, supra note 56.
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DEFINING FLORIDA STATUTE § 63.082(6)
The intervention statute created a new dynamic in the dependency
system and the initial responses from DCF and the juvenile courts were
not always positive. Although, the statute clearly directed that the private
adoption entity is permitted to intervene as a “party in interest” when a
parent executed an adoption consent for the adoption entity and selected a
qualified prospective adoptive family, judges sometimes balked at the idea
and exercised discretion to deny the request. 68 In 2005, the Second District
Court of Appeal issued a decision that ended this debate and clarified that
the statute required that the trial court grant the intervention whenever the
identified conditions were met; the decision was not a discretionary call
for the court. 69 The court in Adoption Miracles rather bluntly pointed out
that the statutory language directing that the adoption entity “shall be
permitted to intervene” meant exactly that, and the court was not at liberty
to deny the request to intervene when the consents were properly executed
and a qualified family was chosen. 70
Not long after the Adoption Miracles case, Florida appellate courts
were called upon to deal with a scenario where a parent chose to participate
in a private adoption through the intervention statute, but after the consent
was executed and the intervention was granted, the selected family
withdrew from the adoption plan. 71 In C.G. v. Guardian Ad Litem
Program, the appellate court was asked to determine the responsibility of
the private adoption entity and the status of the consent of the parent.72
Since there was no evidence of fraud or duress in the execution of the
original adoption consent and the consent had the effect of surrendering
the child to the private adoption entity, the appellate court determined that
the consent remained valid, binding, and enforceable, and the adoption
entity continued to be responsible for the child. 73 The result of this
determination was that the adoption entity was presented with limited
options in the absence of an appropriate replacement family.
One of those options, and the only one that was reasonably available
in this case, was to transfer the valid consent, and all authority over the
child, to DCF. 74 This outcome was, without a doubt, a difficult resolution
for a process designed to allow parents to actively participate in the
selection of a permanent adoptive home for the child, but it provided some
Id.
re S.N.W., 912 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
70 Id.
71C.G. v. Guardian Ad Litem Program, 920 So. 2d 854, 855 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2006).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
68

69In
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guidance to all involved for future cases that might involve similar
challenges. Certainly, private adoption entities will now be decidedly
more cautious in accepting consents on older children or special needs
children, which could have a chilling effect on participation in the
intervention process. 75 In addition, private adoption entities must now
warn parents of the risk that they might lose the right to contest the
termination of their parental rights by DCF if the arrangement with the
selected family falls through. 76 The C.G. case presents some concerning
risks for parents seeking to proceed with a private adoption, but it is, thus
far, the only case creating potential pitfalls for the parents exercising their
rights under the intervention statute.
By 2012, the Intervention Statute was widely implemented
throughout the State, and many of the original difficulties had been
resolved or greatly diminished. 77 With no reported cases of any
intervention children being returned to the care of the state, and with
significant numbers of dependent children finding permanency with
qualified families chosen by their parents, the statute began to catch the
attention of Florida legislators. Not only was the process providing safe
and loving homes more quickly, but the state was also saving enormous
amounts of money. 78 Since the intervention process operates from
consents, as opposed to involuntary termination proceedings, the legal
expenses for trials, appeals and court appointed counsel were dramatically
reduced or eliminated for these cases. 79 Additionally, in most intervention
cases, the adoptive parents did not seek the ongoing financial assistance
provided by the Florida Adoption Assistance Act, which is typically
available to children adopted out of foster care.80 Most importantly, the
ability to participate in the intervention process enabled many parents to
become appropriately proactive in the permanency decisions affecting
their children. 81 Instead of simply reacting to the decisions of DCF with
anger and a sense of victimization, the parents make important decisions
for the best interest of their child with the help of the adoption entity with
whom they chose to work. 82 Often, the parents are able to meet the
T. Tate, supra note 56.
Id.
77 Id.
78Intervention is a Win Win Option!, Hope For Families,
http://www.adoptioninterventionflorida.org/resources/intervention-is-a-win-win-option.
79Jeanne T. Tate, supra note 56.
80Jeanne T. Tate, supra note 56.
81Intervention is a Win Win Option!, Hope For Families,
http://www.adoptioninterventionflorida.org/resources/intervention-is-a-win-win-option.;
see also Intervention, Heart Of Adoptions, Inc., http://heartofadoptions.com/interventions
(2016).
82Jeanne T. Tate, supra note 56.
75Jeanne
76
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prospective adoptive parents, and they can negotiate for pictures, letters,
and, in some cases, even ongoing contact with the child. 83
While this sounds like a win for all of the parties involved—the state,
the parents, the prospective adoptive parents, and the child—some
problems have continued to interfere with the statute’s potential. The most
significant impediment statewide had to do with the lack of information
and/or misinformation provided to the parents whose children were taken
into custody by the State. 84 Many parents reported never having been told
that they could participate in a private adoption while others were
affirmatively told that they would “not be allowed” to participate in a
private adoption. 85 In a variety of different of ways, the intervention
process was treated as a privilege rather than a right by many in positions
of authority within the dependency system. 86 It was treated as an option
that DCF, and sometimes the Guardian ad Litem, could fight and avoid if
they wanted to. 87
Provisions in the statute ensuring court oversight of the child’s best
interest have been interpreted, on many occasions, as allowing for a
“custody case” between the placement selected by the parent or parents
the placement preferred by DCF, the Guardian ad Litem appointed for the
child, or the Court. 88 By providing inadequate or untimely information
about intervention, the courts have been faced with a dilemma regarding
the best interests of the children. Even a parent acting very diligently, once
the correct and complete information was provided, could be confronted
with concerns that the child may currently be in a stable, pre-adoptive
home, and moving the child again could be destabilizing and detrimental.
Although a valid concern, the lack of any functional statutory notice
requirement coupled with a generalized resistance on the part of DCF to
allow parents alleged to be guilty of abuse, abandonment or neglect, to
determine permanency options, often resulted in parents not being able to
take advantage of the process. This issue, along with some generalized
confusion about the proper procedure for the courts to follow in
implementing an intervention process, required a statutory
For Families, supra note 73; see also Intervention, Heart Of Adoptions, Inc.,
http://heartofadoptions.com/interventions (2016).
84Jeanne T. Tate, supra note 56.
85Jeanne T. Tate, supra note 56; see also THE FLORIDA SENATE, INTERIM REPORT, S.
2010-104 (2009),
http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/Publications/2010/Senate/reports/interim_reports/pdf/201
0-104cf.pdf (“DCF and its community-based providers (CBC) are reported to object to
the intervention and slow the private adoption process”).
86Jeanne T. Tate, supra note 56.
87 Id.
88Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.082(6)(b) (West 2013).
83Hope
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adjustment. 89As a result, amendments to the statute were proposed and
passed in 2012. 90
The most significant change proposed in the 2012 statute was the
clear identification of the intervention option as a “right” and the specific
requirement that both DCF and the juvenile court advise the parents of
their rights prior to the filing of a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights.91
This change, at first blush, seems to be a relatively minor procedural
adjustment but, in reality, ushers in a brand new dialogue. The concept of
“intervention,” initially created to facilitate cooperation between DCF and
private adoption entities in the hopes of locating families for waiting
children, has now become a statute about balancing the parent’s
constitutional rights with the state’s compelling interest in protecting the
child from abuse, abandonment, or neglect. 92 Florida Statute § 63.082(6)
has itself become the Florida legislature’s identification of the “least
restrictive means” to accomplish that goal. 93
However, the fight does not end there. Even with the progress made
since 2003, intervention continued to be a slow change. 94 There still
existed the problem that parents were not being told of their right to
participate in the permanency of their child through an intervention
proceeding. 95 Effective July 1, 2016, the Florida Legislature amended the
intervention statute to remedy issues that continue to occur. The main
focus of the change was for a parent’s right to intervention to be shouted
loud and proud, early and often. 96
To encourage intervention earlier in a case, Section 63.082(6)(g) now
requires the trial court to provide written notice of the right to participate
in a private adoption three times: at the arraignment hearing, in the case
plan approval order, and in the order changing the permanency goal to
adoption. 97 Prior to the 2016 amendment, the court was only required to
advise the parent of the option to participate in a private adoption plan
once it was so far along in the case that reunification was no longer a viable
option and the department was proceeding to terminate the parental rights
to the child. 98 However, providing a parent with sufficient notice was not
the only goal of the 2016 amendment.
89H.B.

1163, 114th Sess. (Fla. 2012).
STAT. ANN. § 63.082 (West 2012).
91FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(6)(g) (West 2012).
92FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082 (West 2013).
93FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(6)(b)(West 2013).
94Jeanne T. Tate, supra note 56.
95Jeanne T. Tate, supra note 56.
96Jeanne T. Tate, supra note 56.
97FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(6)(g) (West 2016).
98FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(6)(g) (West 2013).
90FLA.
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A major change the Guardian ad Litem Program (GALP) advocated
for was the standard by which the court should determine changing the
child’s placement when a parent signs a valid consent. 99 A huge impetus
for this change was the shock that arose after In re Adoption of K.A.G. 100
In 2014, Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeals was faced with a
situation where a father, charged with murdering the child’s mother,
executed a consent prior to the termination of his rights for the adoption
of the child directed to the paternal grandmother. 101 There was a knee-jerk
reaction that boiled down to total shock that a man who was charged with
murder could use the statutes to take the child out of the maternal aunt’s
care and place the child in his own mother’s care. 102 The Court ultimately
held that the intervention statute was inapplicable in this case because the
child was not in the custody of the department but the case raised a number
of questions about how the language of the statute might need to be
improved or modified. 103.The 2016 amendment lessens the ambiguity of
the previous language in 63.082(6)(a) by dictating that intervention applies
to cases in which the child is in DCF’s custody or under the department’s
supervision, thereby solidifying a parent’s right to a private adoption. 104
However, even though the court in K.A.G. found the intervention
statute inapplicable, the fear still existed that a parent charged with
egregious conduct in another case could potentially intervene and decide
where to place the child. Therefore, the statute was further amended to
allow the court to consider whether the change of placement is in the best
interests of the child, instead of only requiring the determination of
whether the placement is “appropriate.” 105 Section 63.082(6)(e) lists all
the relevant factors the court must consider in making this determination
and allows the court to consider certain factors that they could not
before—including the recommendation of the GALP and whether the
parent has acted with egregious behavior. 106
T. Tate, supra note 56.
T. Tate, supra note 56.
101See In re Adoption of K.A.G., 152 So. 3d 1271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
102Jeanne T. Tate, supra note 56.
103K.A.G., 152 So. 3d at 1275.
104FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(6)(a) (West 2016).
105Compare Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.082(6)(c) (West 2013), and Fla. Stat. Ann. §
63.082(6)(c) (West 2016).
106Compare Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.082(6)(e) (West 2013), and Fla. Stat. Ann. §
63.082(6)(e) (West 2016).
In determining whether the best interests of the child are served by transferring the
custody of the minor child to the prospective adoptive parent selected by the parent or
adoption entity, the court shall consider and weigh all relevant factors, including, but not
limited to:
1. The permanency offered;
99Jeanne

100Jeanne
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GOING FORWARD
To be fair, none of this involves new concepts, but rather it is about
getting back to basics. When private individuals first banded together to
try and help abused children, it is highly doubtful that any of them ever
envisioned anything along the lines of our current government-operated
child welfare agencies. The early efforts struggled with an inability to
successfully intervene in circumstances that were detrimental to children.
Because of the rights of the parents, oftentimes too little could be done to
protect the children. Over a century later, much has changed. Children can
be protected by the state and parents today struggle to maintain authority
over their children in the face of large powerful child welfare agencies. In
this pendulum swing, the sense of an appropriate balance, consistent with
constitutional principles, appears to have been lost. Florida Statute §
63.082(6) is, therefore, not revolutionary or cutting edge, but rather
reflects the need to return to a more balanced approach to these conflicting
rights. Neither extreme is an ideal that we, as a society, should accept. We
cannot abandon children to be abused or neglected while we stand by
unable to provide assistance to relieve the suffering of our most vulnerable
citizens. We also, however, cannot condone a situation where parents have
no rights and all decisions regarding the best interests of a child are made
by the state with little or no limitations on that authority. It is difficult to
argue that permitting parents to participate in permanency planning for
their child is an appropriate balancing of these interests, but theories are
often easier than on the ground realities.
When the dependency court is faced with a parent who wants to
exercise their right to participate in permanency planning, but the parent’s
preferred plan appears to be detrimental to the child’s best interest, how
should this conflict be resolved? How “detrimental” does it have to be
before we deny the parent’s constitutional rights? A little or a lot? And
who determines what is “detrimental”? What if one parent wants the child
to stay where he or she currently is living, but the other parent wants the
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

The established bonded relationship between the child and the current caregiver
in any potential adoptive home in which the child has been residing;
The stability of the potential adoptive home in which the child has been
residing as well as the desirability of maintaining continuity of placement;
The importance of maintaining sibling relationships, if possible;
The reasonable preferences and wishes of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient maturity, understanding, and experience to express a
preference;
Whether a petition for termination of parental rights has been filed pursuant to
s. 39.806(1)(f), (g), or (h);
What is best for the child; and
The right of the parent to determine an appropriate placement for the child.

74

CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:55

child placed elsewhere? What if a parent wants to participate in the
selection of a permanent adoptive home for the child,and executes a
consent in accordance with Florida Statute § 63.082(6), but the parent is
accused of having engaged in behavior extremely harmful to the child?
Should we still grant consideration to that parent’s desire? What if the
parent’s selection of a permanency option for the child appears to be
collusive in order to allow that parent to acquire access to the child again
in the future, which could expose the child to future abuse or neglect?
These are just some of the many concerns that improper balancing could
leave unresolved. Florida Statute § 63.082(6) presents an opportunity to
achieve a functional balance. Yet these types of issues will need to be
resolved case by case, and until these questions are answered by the courts,
we will not be able to predict the level of success that the statute will
ultimately have or the impact the private adoption entities will be able to
have in the dependency arena.

